> Well exactly... doesn't that show you that it's a bad idea?
I don't think so, no. Sometimes we think too abstractly and make what turn out to be poor decisions. Emotions are really valuable heuristics and should be harnessed at a time like this.
Absolutely not, mutually assured destruction only works if both sides know that the other is committed to carrying out a retaliatory strike in the minutes before their death. It’s essential that the person in the position to order a retaliatory strike be someone ready to kill hundreds of millions of people for no reason other than the fact that they said they would. Putting emotional barriers between that person and the codes they need to carry out that enormous responsibility just makes it less likely that they will be able to follow through. If there’s sufficient uncertainty about whether there will be a follow-through then the nuclear arsenal loses its deterrence factor and we’re back to having to live with the fear that our rational enemies may carry out a first strike on us.
> Absolutely not, mutually assured destruction only works if both sides know that the other is committed to carrying out a retaliatory strike in the minutes before their death.
Not really. You would need to be absolutely certain that the other party won’t carry out a retaliatory strike before they’re destroyed.
The only thing that matters is that the other party is capable of indescriminate destruction, not the certainty they’ll actually do it.
It’s like punching someone holding a gun in the face.
I don't think so, no. Sometimes we think too abstractly and make what turn out to be poor decisions. Emotions are really valuable heuristics and should be harnessed at a time like this.