I would encourage you to think on this some more until the discomfort diminishes. Just because things are deterministic (at a level of complexity that is difficult or even possible to imagine, let alone predict with our current understanding), doesn't mean your experience is any less real or important for you.

Imagine you are on a rollercoaster: you know your course is pre-determined, but you can't see too far ahead, and it sure is a fun and surprising ride along the way.

But it might get really boring and pointless if I only watch and can't get off the rails

Assuming determinism, you could still do whatever you wanted. It's just that your desires would be pre-determined.

I think that's unlikely to happen. Even if it all is deterministic, the amount of variables at play will make it very difficult to determine the outcome beforehand (if not even impossible, eg Conway's Game of Life).

You personally determine what 'boring' and 'pointless' are and how important they are.

I think the question one has to answer first is what "intention" is in itself, at least some informal definition to work with is necessary. how you define it will shape the answer to the rock intention.

> Set the initial conditions and then the whole thing is deterministic

If quantum physics theories are correct than there's always some amount of pure randomness in the game, making it impossible to create perfectly deterministic and repeatable system of any significant complexity.

Randomness is not an objection to determinism. The problem is not that decisions can not be predicted, the problem is that some people think decisions don't exist. For that vision is irrelevant if they happen by chance or by rules.

The real answer is that decisions exist in a different frame of reference. Some philosophers are stuck in a model in which decisions were taken by the soul, an inmaterial entity. So if decisions are generated by physical processes, they're an ilusion.

But that's as idiotic as it can be. Our brain is a material system and of course decisions are generated by physical processes inside it. The interesting question is how much of us is malleable and how we can make our decisions to change ourselves and our own decision making process.

Where does the randomness come from? If we could rewind the universe back to the same starting conditions, would it be any different the second time through and if so, where did that difference come from?

If you suppose an infinite multiverse where every possible thing happens in parallel, a typical observer will find themself in a universe with events that seem random. There are a lot more random-looking numbers than orderly-looking numbers.

Randomness in the map does not equal randomness in the territory, i.e. randomness may be a feature of our world-model, not the world itself.

Well... From a game designers perspective a player has very little free will... Yes they can make choices but in the grand scheme all the choices are predetermined.

Good level design is basically when a player traverses a predetermined path while not feeling that he is on rails...

Example og good level design, Half Life games. A player Traverse the world as if they can go anywhere but they always pick the right way.

Other example is Dark souls. Keeps you in a loops so you never hit a "dead end"

Rocks are strictly inadvertent.

Intentions are deterministic and your discomfort about the topic is deterministic too. Are you aware of the cause of that discomfort?

This reminds me of Sam Harris' book "Freewill", I recommend it to the people who believe in freewill.

By the way, what determines the whole chain of deterministic events?

I recommend Dennett's review of Harris's book to people who recommend it: https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/13814

Also Elbow Room, or, better, Freedom Evolves.

Thanks, I like to see the other side when I believe something.

I once read Dennett's critiques and I remember I didn't find them very convincing. But right now I don't remember his arguments. I won't analyze them right now as to be able to comment in this topic. If you mention Dennett's main argument against what Harris says about freewill I'd thank you.

Marvin Minsky said we are 'meat machines'. What does Dennet say against that? (considering machines as deterministic).

Dennett's overall claim is that incompatiblists are making a category error when they say that determinism at the physical level precludes free will at the level of subjective experience. He argues that free will, and really any kind of freedom at all, emerges from the layers upon layers upon layers that make up the existence of what we call a living creature. (And that there are layers, or degrees, of freedom.)

I'm afraid I don't remember the exact contents of the Harris/Dennett debate; I should probably reread it myself. :)

Thanks for the summary.

any kind of freedom at all, emerges from the layers upon layers upon layers that make up the existence of what we call a living creature.

I don't see why layers upon layers would imply freedom. A complex Java web framework may have layers upon layers of abstractions, and that may make its operation hard to understand fully. But that doesn't mean it isn't deterministic.

Spinoza wrote: Men are mistaken in thinking themselves free; their opinion is made up of consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of the causes by which they are determined.

Great link.